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A More Balanced Approach to Ex Parte
Interviews by Treating Physicians
William K Mc Visk *
I.

INTRODUCTION

Beginning with Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories,I several recent Illinois appellate decisions have created a new type of witness privilege that purportedly stems from the physician-patient privilege.
Unlike the physician-patient privilege, however, which prohibits
the discovery and introduction of evidence regarding confidential
communications, this newly developed privilege prohibits only one
means of discovering otherwise discoverable evidence and is not
limited to protecting confidential communications. Illinois appellate courts have held that the attorney representing a defendant in
a personal injury action may not conduct ex parte interviews of the
plaintiff's treating physicians.2 The courts have upheld this privilege even though the patient has otherwise waived the physicianpatient privilege with respect to that litigation by filing the suit and
thereby placing his physical condition at issue.3
* Partner, Peterson, Ross, Schloerb & Seidel, Chicago, Illinois; J.D., 1977, Northwestern University; B.A., 1974, University of Illinois. The author would like to express
his appreciation to Richard L. Davidson, a third year student at New York University
Law School, for his assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. 148 I11.App. 3d 581, 499 N.E.2d 952 (1st Dist. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3232
(1987).
2. Presumably these decisions will be applicable equally when the defendant's physical condition is at issue. Because this situation is relatively rare, however, this Article,
like the cases creating the privilege, will assume in the interest of simplicity that it is the
plaintiff who has placed his physical condition at issue and that the defendants will seek
to interview the plaintiff's physicians.
3. Id. See also Tomasovic v. American Honda, 171 Ill. App. 3d 979, 525 N.E.2d
1111 (1st Dist. 1988); Karsten v. McCray, 157 t11.App. 3d 1, 509 N.E.2d 1376 (2d Dist.),
leave to appeal denied, 117 111. 2d 544 (1987); Yates v. El-Deiry, 160 I11.App. 3d 198, 513
N.E.2d 519 (3d Dist. 1987).
There is a distinct split of authority on this issue in other jurisdictions. The rule
prohibiting ex parte conferences has been applied in the following cases, among others:
Alston v. Greater Southeast Community Hosp., 107 F.R.D. 35 (D.D.C. 1985); Roosevelt
Hotel Ltd. Partnership v. Sweeney, 349 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 1986); Wenneuger v. Muesing, 307 Minn. 405, 240 N.W.2d 333 (1976); Nelson v. Lewis, 130 N.H. 106, 534 A.2d
720 (1987); Smith v. Ashby, 106 N.M. 358, 743 P.2d 114 (1987); Anker v. Brodnitz, 98
Misc. 2d 148, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1979); London v. Mhyre, 110 Wash. 2d 675, 756 P.2d
138 (1988). On the other hand, a number of jurisdictions permit ex parte conferences
with treating physicians: Manion v. N.P.W. Medical Center, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 585
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Unfortunately, the scope of the privilege thus created has not
been delineated clearly. Consequently, practitioners cannot easily
predict when this new privilege will be applied or in what situations they may be permitted to engage in ex parte communications
with the physicians who have previously treated the plaintiff.
These uncertainties are perhaps most evident in cases involving
hospital and medical malpractice, as attorneys representing physicians and hospitals must determine which among the many physicians, employees, and staff members4 who have cared for the
plaintiff may be interviewed outside the presence of the plaintiff's
attorneys.
This uncertainty has been exacerbated by the recent decision of
the First District Court of Appeals that this privilege should be
applied to prohibit counsel for a defendant hospital from conferring with physicians employed by that hospital.5 An examination
of the policies used to justify the prohibition of ex parte communications with treating physicians, as well as the legitimate and long
recognized interests of defense counsel in conducting some portions of their investigation outside the presence of their adversaries,
reveals that the prohibition should be applied only when the physician who treated the plaintiff is not employed by any of the parties
and did not participate in any of the actions or care which are
alleged to have wrongfully caused the plaintiff's injuries.
II.

THE DECISIONS PROHIBITING Ex PARTE
CONFERENCES IN ILLINOIS

A.

Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories

In Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories,6 the attorney for a manufac(M.D. Pa. 1987) (Pennsylvania law applied); Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126
(D.D.C. 1983); Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371 (Alaska 1987); Stempler v.
Speidell, 100 N.J. 368, 495 A.2d 857 (1985) (interviews allowed after notice to patient or
his counsel); Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, 549 A.2d 950 (1988) (in action
for invasion of privacy).
4. The physician-patient privilege generally is considered to be limited to licensed
physicians. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-802 (1987). All of the Illinois appellate
court decisions to date have involved physicians. See supra note 3. Yet one Illinois trial
court decision, now on appeal to the Fifth District Appellate Court, has held the Petrillo
rule to be applicable to non-physician hospital staff members. Roberson v. Liu, No. 83 L
738 (Cir. Ct. I11.20th Cir., St. Clair County, Nov. 2, 1987), appeal docketed, No. 5-870801 (Ill. App. 5th Dist. Nov. 30, 1987).
5. Ritter v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Lukes Medical Center, 177 I11.App. 3d 313, 532
N.E.2d 327 (1st Dist. 1988).
6. 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 499 N.E.2d 952 (1st Dist. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3232
(1987).
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turer of infant formulas, Syntex Laboratories ("Syntex"), advised
the trial court that he planned to conduct an ex parte interview of
one of the plaintiff's treating physicians. 7 The plaintiff's attorney
moved for an order barring defense counsel from engaging in ex
parte conferences with any of the plaintiff's treating physicians. 8
After the plaintiff's motion was granted, defense counsel advised
the trial court that he planned to violate the court's order, and the
court subsequently held him in contempt of court.9
On appeal, counsel for Syntex raised a number of arguments to
justify ex parte interviews with the plaintiff's treating physician.
Most importantly, counsel argued that the physician-patient privilege was inapplicable because it had been waived by the plaintiff by
his act of filing suit.' 0 This contention was based on the statutory
provision that the physician-patient privilege would not apply in
"all actions brought by or against the patient ... wherein the pa-

tient's physical or mental condition is an issue."'"
The Petrillo court recognized that the statutory privilege would
7.
8.
9.
10.
lished

Id. at 585, 499 N.E.2d at 955.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 603, 499 N.E.2d at 967. In Illinois, the physician-patient privilege is estabby statute, and provides:
No physician or surgeon shall be permitted to disclose any information he or
she may have acquired in attending any patient in a professional character, necessary to enable him or her professionally to serve such patient, except only (1)
in trials for homicide when the disclosure relates directly to the fact or immediate circumstances of the homicide, (2) in actions, civil or criminal, against the
physician for malpractice, (3) with the expressed consent of the patient, or in
case of his or her death or disability, of his or her personal representative or
other person authorized to sue for personal injury or of the beneficiary of an
insurance policy on his or her life, health or physical condition, (4) in all actions
brought by or against the patient, his or her personal representative, a beneficiary under a policy of insurance, or the executor or administrator of his or her
estate wherein the patient's physical or mental condition is an issue, (5) upon an
issue as to the validity of a document as a will of the patient, (6) in any criminal
action where the charge is either first degree murder by abortion, attempted
abortion or abortion, (7) in actions, civil or criminal, arising from the filing of a
report in compliance with the 'Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act,'
approved June 26, 1975, (8) to any department, agency, institution or facility
which has custody of the patient pursuant to State statute or any court order of
commitment or (9) in prosecutions where written results of blood alcohol tests
are admissible pursuant to Section 11-501.4 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.
In the event of a conflict between the application of this Section and the
Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, certified
January 9, 1979, to a specific situation, the provisions of the Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act shall control.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-802 (1987).
11. Petrillo, 148 I11.
App. 3d at 603, 499 N.E.2d at 967 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, para. 8-802(4) (1987)).
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not apply to either formal discovery procedures or the presentation
of evidence concerning communications between the plaintiff and
his physicians, because under the statute, the patient implicitly
consents to such disclosure by filing suit and placing his physical or
mental condition in issue.' 2 The court concluded, however, that
the statutory waiver of the physician-patient privilege is limited to
the provision of medical information sought by the patient's adversary "pursuant only to court authorized methods of discovery.'"' 3
The court rested this limitation of the statutory exception on two
bases. First, the Petrillo court found that no significant interest
would be furthered by ex parte conferences, because ex parte conferences "yield no greater evidence, nor do they provide any additional information, than that which is already obtainable through
the regular methods of discovery."' 4 Second, the court reasoned
that allowing ex parte conferences with opposing counsel would
threaten the fiduciary relationship between a patient and his physician.' 5 The court considered confidentiality to be a necessary element of the fiduciary relationship between patient and physician.' 6
It explained that a physician's ethical obligations require the patient's express or implied consent before any confidential information can be released.' 7 The court reasoned that implied consent
under paragraph 8-802(4) should be construed narrowly and
should be limited to the release of medical information pursuant to
court-authorized discovery methods. 18 The court concluded that a
patient does not, simply by filing suit, consent to "his physician
discussing the patient's confidences in an ex parte conference with
12. Id. at 591, 603, 499 N.E.2d at 959, 967.
13. Id. at 595, 499 N.E.2d at 961 (emphasis in original). Of course, the use of the
term "court authorized" discovery methods to some extent begs the question, because ex
parte interviews could be "court authorized" if the court ruled differently.
14. Id. at 587, 499 N.E.2d at 956.
15. Id. at 588, 590-91, 499 N.E.2d at 957-59.
16. Id. at 591, 603-04, 499 N.E.2d at 959, 967-68.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 603-04, 499 N.E.2d at 967-68. It is implicit in the Petrillo court's opinion
that information beyond the scope of the exception to the privilege would not be disclosed
in formal discovery, because the patient's attorney would be notified and could prevent
the disclosure of information which is not covered by the exception to the privilege. In
contrast, there is no means of protecting confidentiality in an ex parte conference, other
than to trust in the physician to withhold confidential information and in the defense
attorney not to seek such information. The court's reasoning also suggests that a patient's confidence and trust in his physician would not be eroded seriously when the physician discloses the patient's confidential communications to his legal adversary under the
compulsion of a subpoena or court order; whereas the ex parte interview inherently creates the impression of collusion and bad faith between the defense counsel and the patient's physician.
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the patient's legal adversary.' 9
An essential element of the court's holding was its perception
that ex parte conferences with the patient's legal adversary could
undermine the relationship between the physician and patient. As
the court explained:
[W]e find that the entire concept of the ex parte conference tends
to weaken the compelling obligations of a fiduciary. At the very
heart of every fiduciary relationship, including that between a patient and his physician, there exists an atmosphere of trust, loyalty, and faith in the discretion of a fiduciary. That being so, we
find it difficult to believe that a physician can engage in an ex
parte conference with the legal adversary of his patient without
20
endangering the trust and faith invested in him by his patient.
Thus, the court concluded that ex parte conferences, which
threaten the fiduciary relationship between physician and patient,
while providing no additional information to the defendant, are
2
against public policy. '
As articulated by the Petrillo court, the primary goal behind the
prohibition of ex parte conferences is to foster the confidential and
fiduciary relationship between the physician and patient by avoiding the appearance that the patient's physician may be acting contrary to the patient's interests by engaging in ex parte
communications with the patient's legal adversary. It may be
doubtful that any confidential material which was not already subject to production under the statutory waiver of the physician-patient privilege would actually be disclosed during an ex parte
conference. Nevertheless, the court in Petrillo apparently concluded that the mere appearance of collusion and breach of faith
engendered by such conferences is sufficient to cause the patient to
lose the confidence in his physician which is necessary to the physician-patient relationship.
The Petrillo court emphasized that its decision was based both
on the absence of legitimate need for such conferences by the defendant and the damage to the physician-patient relationship it
feared would result from such conferences. 22 The court recognized
that neither the physician-patient privilege nor the fiduciary rela19. Id. at 591, 499 N.E.2d at 959.
20. Id. at 595, 499 N.E.2d at 962.
21. Id. at 596, 499 N.E.2d at 962. The court's conclusion in was strengthened significantly by the factual setting: the physician in question was not employed by any of the
parties and was not involved in any of the acts which allegedly caused the plaintiff's
injuries. Id. at 585, 499 N.E.2d at 955. As will be discussed below, either of these factors
would have seriously undermined the court's reasoning.
22. Id. at 588, 596, 499 N.E.2d at 957, 962.
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tionship between physician and patient is absolute. It further
noted that the statutory privilege and its relevant exceptions reflect
a sound balancing of the societal need for privacy within the physi"desire to see that the
cian-patient relationship against society's
23
truth is reached in civil disputes.
In view of these two essential bases for the privilege, courts in
future cases should consider two questions in determining whether
the Petrillo privilege should be applied:
1. Need for Ex Parte Conference:
Are there countervailing policy considerations which would
make the application of the Petrillo rule against the defendants
unfair or inequitable by limiting their ability to defend the case?
2. Damage to FiduciaryRelationship:
Has the patient's continued expectation of confidentiality as to
the physician been abrogated by filing the suit in question?
An affirmative answer to either of these questions should render
the Petrillo rule inapplicable.
B.

Subsequent Illinois Cases

The Petrillo holding has been followed in several subsequent decisions of the Illinois appellate courts. 24 The most expansive reading of the Petrillo privilege was that of the First District Appellate
Court in the recent decision of Ritter v. Rush-Presbyterian-St.
Luke's Medical Center.25 In Ritter, the court addressed the situation in which counsel for a defendant hospital interviewed several
physicians who had treated the plaintiff after a fall in the hospital.
The Ritter case is unique in that several of the physicians interviewed were residents employed by the defendant hospital. 26 None
of these physicians, however, were involved in the occurrence
which gave rise to the lawsuit.27
23. Id. at 603, 499 N.E.2d at 967.
24. See Tomasovic v. American Honda, 171 Ill. App. 3d 979, 525 N.E.2d 1111 (1st
Dist. 1988); Karsten v. McCray, 157 Ill. App. 3d 1, 509 N.E.2d 1376 (2d Dist. 1987);
Yates v. EI-Deiry, 160 Ill. App. 3d 198, 513 N.E.2d 519 (3d Dist. 1987).
App. 3d 313, 532 N.E.2d 327 (1st Dist. 1988).
25. 177 Ill.
26. Id. at 316, 532 N.E.2d at 328.
27. Id. at 317, 532 N.E.2d at 329. Under the circumstances of Ritter, the occurrence
was easy to identify, as the plaintiff sustained injuries in a fall from a gurney. Id. at 315,
532 N.E.2d at 328. Nevertheless, not all malpractice cases involve such an easily identifiable occurrence. For example, in a case involving a failure to diagnose cancer, there may
be numerous examinations by several physicians over the course of a number of years.
Before the plaintiff has produced experts for their depositions, it may be impossible to
anticipate which of the physicians who have examined the plaintiff will be criticized for
failing to recognize the signs of cancer.
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After rejecting the defendant's request to reconsider Petrillo,28
the court also rejected the hospital's argument that the Petrillo rule
should not apply to physicians employed by the defendant hospital.29 Without specifically considering whether any of the policy
considerations behind Petrillo justified extending the privilege to
the defendant's employees, the court concluded "that any agency
principles applicable to the relationship between a hospital and an
employee physician [do not] outweigh the public policy considerations underlying the physician-patient privilege. Thus, agency
principles cannot abrogate the physician-patient privilege."30
The Ritter court, however, did recognize that the privilege
should not be applied to employee-physicians when the patient
seeks to hold the hospital liable for the negligence or malpractice of
the employee-physician.3 ' The court agreed that in such a situation, "the exclusion of the hospital from the physician-patient privilege would . . . effectively prevent the hospital from defending

itself by barring communication with the physician for whose con-

'32
duct the hospital is allegedly liable."

Essentially, the Ritter court's recognition that the Petrillo rule
should not apply when the defendant hospital's liability is predicated upon the acts of its employee-physicians stems from the fact
that there are countervailing policy considerations which would
make the application of Petrillo unfair. Unfortunately, the Ritter
court failed to consider a number of legitimate reasons why hospital-defendants must be allowed to interview all of their employeephysicians who have participated in the plaintiffs' care. Moreover,
the court failed to consider whether the plaintiff continues to have
a legitimate expectation of confidentiality from a physician employed by a hospital when the patient has sued that physician's
employer.
III.

POLICIES FAVORING Ex PARTE CONFERENCES WITH
CERTAIN WITNESSES

Despite the purportedly strong public policy favoring mainte28. Id. at 319, 532 N.E.2d at 330.
29. Id. at 317, 532 N.E.2d at 329.
30. Id. This statement may reflect confusion on the part of the court, because the
Petrillo privilege is not coextensive with the physician-patient privilege, at least not as
that privilege is embodied in paragraph 8-802, which provides an exception to the privilege in suits where the patient's condition is in issue. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8802(4) (1987). See supra note 10.
31. Ritter, 177 Il. App. 3d at 317-18, 532 N.E.2d at 329-30.
32. Id.
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nance of the fiduciary and confidential relationship between patient
and physician, the Petrillo court left no doubt that this public policy can be outweighed by the need for relevant evidence in a civil
lawsuit.33 Therefore, the limits of the prohibition on ex parte conferences should be determined in large measure by the extent to
which ex parte conferences, in a given situation, do foster the truth
finding process or confer some other benefit to litigants in their
trial preparation which would outweigh the potential for damage
to the fiduciary relationship between physician and patient.
A moment's reflection on the nature of the adversary system
reveals a number of situations in which ex parte communications
between counsel and a potential witness are essential to both truth
finding and the adversary process. The most obvious scenario is
the need to interview one's own client outside the presence of the
adversary. Indeed, courts have long held that attorneys may not
only discuss the case with their client ex parte, but that those communications will be privileged from disclosure.34
The policy underlying the attorney-client privilege "is to encourage a client to fully present the facts of his legal problem to his
attorney." 35 Few of the courts considering the issue of the attorney-client privilege have articulated a reason why confidentiality
and full disclosure of the facts to the client's attorney are necessary, but the existence of the privilege reflects the recognition that
an attorney's effectiveness would be severely undermined if he were
unable to obtain a full disclosure of the facts from his client. As
Dean McCormick explained, the justification for the attorney-client privilege stems from the fact that claims and disputes in litiga33. Commentators have often stated that the physician-patient privilege is out of
favor because it is unnecessary, it inhibits the truth-finding process, and so many exceptions have been engrafted upon it that it has been vitiated. See, e.g., C. DEWITT, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND PATIENT 31-39 (1958); C.
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 105, at 258-59 (Cleary 3d ed. 1984); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVI-

DENCE § 2380(a) (McNaughten rev. ed. 1961); Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is
Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52
YALE L.J. 607 (1943).

34. See, e.g., People v. Adam, 51 111. 2d 46, 48, 280 N.E.2d 205, 207, cert. denied, 409
U.S. 958 (1972); Dickerson v. Dickerson, 322 Ill. 492, 500, 153 N.E. 740, 743 (1926)
(clients should be safe in confiding most secret facts to their counsel); Thayer v. McEwen,
4 I11.
App. 416, 418 (2d Dist. 1879) (everyone has right to communicate freely with counsel concerning any aspect of a case, and all such communications are privileged).
35.

Mooney v. Etheridge, 65 I11.
App. 3d 847, 852, 382 N.E.2d 826, 830 (2d Dist.

1978). Accord In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury, 640 F.2d 49, 62 (7th Cir. 1980)
(purpose of attorney client privilege "is to encourage clients to make full disclosure to
their attorneys"); People v. Adam, 51 111. 2d 46, 48, 280 N.E.2d 205, 207, cert. denied,
409 U.S. 948 (1972) (privilege exists so that client "may consult freely with counsel without fear of compelled disclosure").
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tion can best be handled by "practical experts, namely lawyers, and
fully advised
that these experts can act effectively only if they are
36
of the facts by the parties whom they represent."
While many commentators have questioned whether this privilege truly is necessary to ensure full disclosure,37 the courts have
continued to uphold the privilege because of their recognition that
the effective assistance of counsel mandates that the attorney be
allowed to confer with his client in private, without fear that the
client's secrets will be disclosed later by the attorney. 38 Although
the attorney is not likely to discover any admissible evidence at the
ex parte interview with his client which could not be discovered
through formal discovery, the ability to consult with the client
outside the presence of the adversary is essential to effective
representation.
Significantly, the matters learned during a conference between a
lawyer and client are not likely to remain forever free from disclosure. As a party to litigation, a lawyer's client can be deposed by
the opposing counsel, and all of the information which the client
has provided to his attorney can be discovered through such an
examination unless it is irrelevant to the suit or privileged from
disclosure from some other reason. The reason that counsel must
obtain this information initially in private is to enable him to consider whether any of it is privileged or so sensitive that its disclosure would have ramifications more significant than its impact on
the litigation, and to enable counsel to evaluate the claim, frame
36. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 87, at 204-05 (Cleary 3d ed. 1984). See also Fisher
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (as a practical matter, if a client knows that
damaging information is more easily available from his attorney, the client would be
reluctant to confide and it would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice); Radiant Burners v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 318 (7th Cir. 1963).
37. See, e.g., 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285, at 527-28 (McNaughten rev. ed.
1961); Kobak, The Uneven Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporationsin
the Federal Courts, 6 GA. L. REV. 339 (1972); Note, Evidence - Privileged Communications - The Attorney-Client Privilege in the CorporateSetting: A Suggested Approach, 69
MICH. L. REV. 360, 364 (1970).
38. See e.g., Fisher,425 U.S. at 403 (in absence of privilege "it would be difficult to
obtain fully informed legal advice"); United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236
U.S. 318 (1915) (enactment compelling disclosure of attorney-client communications
"would be a practical prohibition upon professional advice and assistance"); Radiant
Burners, 320 F.2d at 322-23; American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Power Co., 211 F.
Supp. 85, 88 (D. Del. 1962) (basis of privilege is "importance of increasing the effectiveness of attorneys by encouraging full disclosure by the client"); A.B. Dick Co. v. Mars, 95
F. Supp. 83, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) ("nor, in the absence of the privilege could lawyers
2d
properly represent their clients"); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 I11.
103, 117-18, 432 N.E.2d 250, 256 (1982); People v. Adam, 51 111. 2d 46, 48, 280 N.E.2d
205, 207, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972).
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his discovery requests, determine areas which need further investigation, and develop evidence to buttress weaknesses in the client's
case. 39 In many cases, an ex parte interview between the attorney
and client is also necessary to point out inconsistencies in the client's statements or between his current statements and past statements, so that the client will realize the damage which can result
from faulty memory or lies.4°
In addition to the need to maintain the secrets of the client, private interviews between the lawyer and his client or between the
lawyer and other witnesses are needed to enable counsel to analyze
and evaluate a case and to form litigation strategy. This need has
been recognized in the context of the attorney's "work product"
privilege. As the United States Supreme Court recognized in Hickman v. Taylor,4 a lawyer must work with a certain degree of privacy, without fearing that his analysis of the client's case will be
open to scrutiny by the client's adversaries.42 To represent his client properly, the attorney must be able to "assemble information,
sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts,
prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and
needless interference." 43 A large part of this process involves interviews with potential witnesses, which are likely to be memorialized
in memoranda and statements. 4 The process of conducting interviews and preparing memoranda analyzing them is likely to reveal
a great deal about the attorney's mental impressions and theories
of the case, so privacy is necessary to prevent the adversary from
discovering these impressions and gaining an unfair advantage in
the litigation.4" Thus, the Supreme Court held that notes of interviews, witness statements and memoranda reflecting an attorney's
interviews, in short the attorney's "work product," should not be
subject to discovery except in unusual situations.46
The work product doctrine has also been recognized in Illinois.47
39. Comment, Ex Parte Communications with Corporate Parties. The Scope of the
Limitations on Attorney Communications with One of Adverse Interest, 82 Nw. U.L. REV.
1274, 1280-81 (1988).
40. This type of inquiry is also essential between the attorney and any person in an
employment relationship with the client, because the client/employer will be responsible
for the employee's conduct and admissions under agency principles.
41. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
42. Id. at 510-11.
43. Id. at 511.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 511-12.
47. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 I11.
2d 103, 110, 432 N.E.2d 250,
252 (1982); Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 I11.
2d 351, 359, 221 N.E.2d 410, 416 (1966).
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As the Illinois Supreme Court stated in Consolidation Coal Co. v.
Bucyrus-Erie Co., 48 "notes regarding oral statements of witnesses,
whether in the form of attorney's mental impressions or memoranda, necessarily reveal in varying degrees the attorney's mental
processes in evaluating the communications."4 9 As a result, the
court held that an attorney's notes and memoranda of oral conversations with witnesses or employees routinely would not be
discoverable. 50

The work product decisions demonstrate the need for counsel to
prepare a case in privacy. The courts' recognition of this need necessarily encompasses a recognition of the legitimate purpose behind private interviews with witnesses: the ability to ascertain the
witness's knowledge without at the same time disclosing counsel's
theories and mental impressions to the adversary. Thus, notes of
witness interviews made by the attorney which include the attorney's mental impressions and case analysis are privileged.51 Yet
this privilege obviously is rendered meaningless if the attorney
must conduct the witness interview in the presence of the adversary, as the attorney's mental impressions and case analysis would
then be displayed openly to the adversary without the need to give
the adversary access to the attorney's notes.52 As the court in IBM
v. Edelstein 53 concluded, restrictions on interviewing witnesses
"not only impair the constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel but are contrary to time-honored and decision-honored
principles, namely, that counsel for all parties have a right to interview an adverse party's witnesses (the witness willing) in private,
without the presence of opposing counsel." 54
Significantly, the facts learned by counsel from a witness are not
privileged under the work product doctrine. Rather, the process of
sifting these facts and analyzing their impact on the case must remain free from discovery. The need for counsel to sort and analyze
facts as they are learned from prospective witnesses makes the ex
parte conference an essential litigation tool. In private conference
with the witness, an attorney may feel free to offer his own inter48.

89 I11. 2d 103, 432 N.E.2d 250 (1982).

49.

Id. at 109, 432 N.E.2d at 253.

50.
51.

Id. at 110, 432 N.E.2d at 253.
Id.

52. IBM v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1975) (confidentiality of interviews
is needed to maximize unhampered access to information and ensure presentation of best
possible case at trial).
53. Id.
54.

Id. at 42.
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pretations of facts and suggest their legal ramifications in a manner
which cannot be done in the presence of opposing counsel. The
knowledge and understanding gained from such a free and private
exchange may enable the attorney to examine more effectively the
interviewed witness or other witnesses at trial.
Nothing in the analysis of the cases supporting the work product
privilege suggests that counsel has any absolute right to interview
all potential witnesses outside the presence of opposing counsel.
Any witness may refuse to speak with counsel for one party or
both, in which case counsel must resort to formal discovery methods. Similarly, each party invariably will refuse ex parte discussions of the case with his opponent's counsel. Nevertheless, this
does not deny the utility of such conferences when the witness is
willing to comply with counsel's informal request or the importance of such conferences in enabling counsel to prepare fully for
litigation. The question of whether counsel should be allowed to
interview a voluntary witness in private should be determined only
after giving substantial weight to the utility of such interviews, balanced against the policies favoring the fiduciary nature of patientphysician relationship. 5
IV.

APPLICATION TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS

There are at least three situations in which a full recognition of
the necessity and utility of ex parte witness interviews together
with a realistic appraisal of the patient's continued legitimate expectation of privacy compels the conclusion that the Petrillo privilege should not apply: first, when the physician to be interviewed is
a party to the litigation or might become a party to a suit; second,
when the physician is employed by a party or potential party; and
third, when the physician was involved in the events out of which
the suit arose.
A.

Party to Suit

No court or legal authority has argued that the Petrillo rule
should be applied when the plaintiff's treating physician is also a
party to the suit, as in cases where the patient has sued the treating
55. In addition to protecting the confidentiality of attorney preparations, ex parte
interviews promote efficiency, as they are less costly and time consuming than depositions, which require at least the presence of counsel for all parties as well as a court
reporter. Depositions are also likely to take longer than an informal interview, because
an attorney likely will attempt to draw out the proceeding to ensure that every relevant
question has been asked. See Comment, supra note 39, at 1284 n.55.
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physician for malpractice.- 6 In such cases, the party's right to the
effective assistance of counsel, which requires counsel to discuss
the case with the defendant in private, becomes paramount. To
deny the right of the attorney to confer in private with the client is
to deny effective assistance of counsel.
Moreover, in this situation the patient has no legitimate expectation that the physician he has sued will maintain the patient's confidences by refraining from discussing the case with his attorney.
Although the physician still must maintain the patient's confidences as to those who are not involved in the litigation, the patient must be expected to recognize that the physician-defendant is
his legal adversary and will not refrain from mentioning the patient's confidences to his attorney if those confidences could be important to the lawyer's preparation of the physician's defense.
Nor is there any likelihood that the physician's attorney will obtain confidential information in an ex parte interview which could
not be ascertained through formal discovery. As the physician-patient privilege is waived when the patient files the complaint, the
physician's attorney could subpoena the patient's medical records
even if he could not receive them on an ex parte basis from his
client, and the few confidential communications which are not reflected in the medical records could be discovered through depositions. Consequently, there is no sound basis on which to restrict
the attorney's access to his own client.
The same rationale should apply to a physician who fears that
legal action might be undertaken against him for an incident which
occurred during the course of treatment. Although suit has not yet
been filed and, thus, there has been no statutory waiver of the privilege, the physician's defense if suit ultimately is filed is likely to be
enhanced significantly by the opportunity to confer with the attorney while events are still fresh in his mind. If the physician must
wait until suit is filed before conferring with his attorney, which
can often take several years, the ability to remember important details of his treatment or its rationale may be lost. Additionally, as
the attorney is bound by professional ethics to maintain the confidentiality of what the physician told him,5 v the extent of the breach
of patient-physician confidentiality will be limited. Thus, the Pe56. The lack of applicability of the Petrillo rule to this situation would seem particularly clear, because the statute creates an express waiver of the physician-patient privilege
in cases in which the patient has sued the physician for malpractice. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, para. 8-802(2) (1987).
57. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 4-101(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110A, para. 4-101(b) (1987).
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trillo rule should not be applied to prevent any physician who is
concerned that he will be named a defendant in a malpractice action from discussing the patient's case with his attorney.
B.

Employee of Party to Suit

The policy considerations which make the Petrillo rule inapplicable to a party to the suit also apply to a party's employee, such as
a physician employed by a defendant hospital. Again, the ability to
confer privately with the employee is essential for the hospital to
receive effective assistance of counsel. Both federal and Illinois
courts have recognized the necessity for counsel to confer with employees of corporations, and have thus applied the attorney-client
privilege to communications with corporate employees by attorneys for that corporation." As the Supreme Court recognized in
Upjohn Co. v. United States: "The privilege exists to protect not
only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it,
but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to
give sound and informed advice." 59 The court further stated that:
In the corporate context
it will frequently be employees beyond the control group . . . who will possess the information
needed by the corporation's lawyers. Middle level - and indeed
lower level - employees can, by their actions within the scope of
their employment, embroil the corporation in serious legal difficulties and it is only natural that these employees would have the
relevant information needed by corporate counsel if he is to adequately advise the client with respect to such actual or potential
difficulties.'
58. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Consolidation Coal Co. v.
Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 Ill. 2d 103, 432 N.E.2d 250 (1982). In Upjohn, the Court construed
the privilege broadly to include both mid and low-level employees who provided information to the corporation's legal counsel in order for the corporation to gain legal advice
concerning corporate matters within the scope of the employee's duties. In contrast, the
Illinois Supreme Court rejected the Upjohn test and restricted the scope of the privilege to
employees within the "control group," i.e., top management and advisors to top management whose role is such that a decision would not usually be made without these employees' advice. Consolidation Coal, 89 Ill. 2d at 120, 432 N.E.2d at 258. Both cases,
however, recognized the need to confer privately with corporate employees. The Illinois
Supreme Court based its restriction of the privilege on its concern that an expansive
privilege would enable corporations to cloak all of their actions in the privilege simply by
including corporate counsel in all decisions. Id. at 116, 432 N.E.2d at 256. This concern
seems irrelevant when a hospital's counsel speaks with a physician as part of his investigation of a claim against the hospital, as the mere right to interview the employee does
not necessarily mean that the conversations would be privileged. Moreover, because the
physician faces personal exposure for his conduct, he would have a personal right to legal
representation as well as a personal attorney-client privilege.
59. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390.
60. Id.

1989]

Ex Parte Interviews of Treating Physicians

Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court, while narrowing the scope of
the employees as to whom the attorney-client privilege is applicable, recognized that it was appropriate to protect consultations
with counsel by those who are decision makers or who substantially influence corporate decisions.6
Both federal and Illinois courts also have extended the protection of the attorney's work product privilege to an attorney's conversations with the corporation's employees.6" These decisions
recognize the necessity and utility of private conferences between
attorneys and the employees of the parties which the attorneys
represent.
An important factor underlying the extension of the attorneyclient and work product privileges to corporations and similarly
justifying the need to interview hospital employees in private, is the
fact that under the doctrine of respondeat superior the corporate or
non-corporate employer may be held legally responsible for the
employee's conduct. Further, under principles of agency law, the
hospital employer normally will be held to have knowledge of
those matters which are known to the employee63 and, therefore,
the hospital-employer's liability can be predicated on the failure to
perform an act which the employee's knowledge made obligatory.
As the hospital employer is legally responsible for its employees'
acts and is held to knowledge of facts known by its employees, its
defense will depend on the ability of its counsel to confer with these
employees in private, as though they were also the attorney's
client.
In most cases the hospital's liability insurance coverage or selfinsurance plan covers both the hospital's and the employee's liability for acts committed within the scope of his employment, so the
employee also may be a client of the hospital's attorney. The employee, even if not a named defendant, faces potential personal liability, and may not have been named as a defendant simply because
he is not considered likely to have sufficient assets to satisfy a judgment. Whatever the reason that only the hospital-employer has
been named, the hospital's attorney must defend the employee to
defend the employer successfully. Thus, to prevent the attorney for
the hospital-employer from privately discussing the case with the
61. Consolidation Coal, 89 Ill. 2d at 118-19, 432 N.E.2d at 257.
62. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 397-402; Consolidation Coal, 89 I11. 2d at 108-11, 432 N.E.2d
at 252-54.
63. Protective Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 144 Ill. App. 3d 682, 694, 494 N.E.2d 1241, 1250
(2d Dist. 1986); Kuska v. Folkes, 73 Ill. App. 3d 540, 544, 391 N.E.2d 1082, 1085 (2d
Dist. 1979).
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employee is tantamount to prohibiting the attorney from discussing the case with his own client.' The adoption of a rule which
would prevent the hospital's counsel from discussing the case with
the employee simply because the employee was not named as a
defendant would enable the plaintiff to control the employer's abil-,
ity to defend the lawsuit by the simple expedient of limiting the
individual defendants named in the complaint.
Nor is it sufficient to provide an exception to Petrillo, as the
court did in Ritter, which only applies to cases in which the liability of the hospital-employer is predicated on the acts of the employee. First, such a rule would prevent the attorney from
discussing the case with any hospital employee until it has become
clear that the plaintiff is basing the hospital's liability on that specific employee's actions. This would prevent communication with
any hospital employee before a complaint is filed, because the hospital could not be certain in advance which actions by which employees will form the basis of the patient's complaint. The
application of the Ritter exception in this manner effectively precludes pre-suit investigation of potential claims. Even after the
complaint has been filed, counsel may not be able to discuss the
facts of the claim with any employee until the plaintiff's theory of
recovery is sufficiently clear to enable defense counsel to identify
the allegedly responsible employees.65 Under the Ritter rule, a
plaintiff's attorney could ambush defense counsel by either deposing or questioning the hospital's employed physicians before dis64. In most cases, the hospital's attorney is retained to represent the employee as well
as the hospital, because the hospital or its insurer recognizes that the hospital's interests
and those of the employee in defending the action are likely to be identical.
65. Under the Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
para. 2-622 (1987) (the "Act"), it may be easier for defense counsel to identify the supposedly responsible employees once suit is filed, because the Act requires a report from a
reviewing health care practitioner specifying the basis for the action. Id. Nothing in the
Act, however, suggests that the plaintiff would be prevented from amending the complaint and providing a revised report if further acts of negligence become apparent after
the complaint has been filed. With the existence of liberal pleading rules and the doctrine
of respondeat superior, there is no reason why such an amendment could not involve
conduct by a hospital employee who was unknown to either the plaintiff or defense counsel when the complaint was filed. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-616 (1987). Moreover, many of the reports of reviewing health care practitioners contain vague and
conclusory allegations which may not be sufficient to enable the allegedly responsible
employees to be identified. Finally, The Illinois appellate courts are divided on the issue
of whether the Act's requirement that a health care practitioner certify that there is a
meritorious cause for filing the action is constitutional. Compare DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., Nos. 1-86-2995, 1-87-0831 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. June 13, 1989) with Sakovich
v. Dodt, 174 I11.App. 3d 649, 529 N.E.2d 258 (3d Dist. 1988); Alford v. Phipps, 169 I11.
App. 3d 845, 523 N.E.2d 563 (4th Dist. 1988); and Bloom v. Guth, 164 I11.App. 3d 475,
517 N.E.2d 1154 (1987), appeal denied, 121 Ill. 2d 567, 526 N.E.2d 827 (1988).
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closing his theory of recovery through the reports of expert
witnesses, while the hospital's attorney could not confer with these
physicians privately to prepare them for their depositions or to determine their potential role in the occurrence.
Furthermore, even when the hospital's liability is not predicated
on the acts of a specific employee, the admissions of the hospitalemployee will be regarded, both legally and practically, as admissions of the hospital. Statements by a corporation's employee concerning matters over which he has authority or apparent authority
are considered to be admissions of the employer.66 Even in situations in which an employee's statements are not legally binding on
the hospital-employer, the fact finder is likely to give substantial
weight to statements against the hospital's interest by one of its
own employees. By imposing the burdens on the defendant hospital of accepting the employee's statements or testimony as its admissions, while prohibiting the hospital's counsel from discussing
the case privately with the employee, the adversarial balance will
be shifted dramatically against a hospital defendant.
In contrast, the plaintiff has little legitimate expectation that
physicians or other health care workers employed by the hospital
will consider their continued fiduciary relationship with the patient
to preclude them from discussing the case with their employer's
attorneys.67 In seeking or accepting treatment from a physician
employed by a hospital, the patient can be expected to recognize
that the physician has a fiduciary relationship with his employer,68
and that the employer has the right to control its employee's
work. 69 The ordinary adult patient is likely to have been employed
at some time, and should realize that a corporate or hospital employee owes some duty of loyalty to the employer and that when a
patient sues the hospital-employer he has, in effect, also sued the
66. See, e.g., Nicholson v. St. Anne Laues, 136 Ill. App. 3d 664, 670, 483 N.E.2d 291,
296 (3d Dist. 1985); Cornell v. Langland, 109 11. App. 3d 472, 476, 440 N.E.2d 985, 988
(1st Dist. 1982).
67. It is questionable whether a patient who files a personal injury action has a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to any of his or her treating physicians. As
one court reasoned, "[w]ith the filing of suit, appellant's privacy expectations were reduced to the extent that she could anticipate that her claims would be investigated."
Moses v. McWilliams, 379 Pa. Super. 150, -, 549 A.2d 950, 955 (1988). The court
concluded that permissible investigation included ex parte interviews of the plaintiff's
treating physicians. Id.
68. Mullaney, Wells & Co. v. Savage, 78 Ill. 2d 534, 545-46, 402 N.E.2d 574, 580
(1980); Corroon & Black, Inc. v. Magner, 145 II1.App. 3d 151, 160, 494 N.E.2d 785, 790
(1st Dist. 1986).
69. See, e.g., Walker v. Midwest Freight Sys., 119 Il1. App. 3d 640, 646, 461 N.E.2d
1373, 1377 (1st Dist. 1983).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 20

employed physician. Thus, in suing, the patient has created an adversary relationship between himself and the employee physician in
addition to that between himself and the hospital-employer.7 0
Similarly, a hospital patient generally will realize that the physician employed by the hospital will share information about the patient with the hospital when it is necessary in the interest of the
employment relationship. For example, physicians routinely supply their patient's diagnosis to the hospital billing department to
prepare bills and complete insurance forms. Similarly, patients are
unlikely to be surprised that reports of unusual incidents are made
to the hospital's quality assurance, risk management, and legal departments. Indeed, a hospital would fail to fulfill its duty to its
patients if it did not review the performance of its staff physicians
by reviewing patients' medical records to ensure that the physicians provided adequate medical care.7 ' Thus, few patients would
assume that if they sue a hospital, the physicians and nurses employed by the hospital would not confer with the hospital's attorney and assist the attorney in defending the case.
The policies underlying the Petrillo decision do not support the
extension of its prohibition on ex parte conferences to employees of
a defendant hospital. Such an extension ignores the practical realities of litigation, which make it essential for hospital counsel to be
able to discuss the case with the hospital's employees outside the
presence of the opposing counsel in order to prepare his case
effectively.
C.

Non-Employee Participantin Medical Care
Surrounding the Occurrence

Just as physicians who fear that legal action may be taken
against them should be exempt from the Petrillo rule, physicians or
medical care personnel who are involved in the conduct leading up
to or immediately following an injury occurring in a hospital or as
the result of medical care should not be subject to the Petrillo rule.
70. It is ironic that the Ritter decision chose to ignore the realities of the employer
relationship at the same time that Illinois appellate courts have expanded the scope of a
hospital's liability for non-employed physicians through the doctrine of apparent agency,
which is essentially based on the assumption that the average patient will assume that
certain physicians, such as anesthesiologists and emergency room physicians, are hospital
employees. See Sztorc v. Northwest Hosp., 146 Ill. App. 3d 275, 496 N.E.2d 1200
(1986).
71. Pickle v. Curns, 106 Ill. App. 3d 734, 739, 435 N.E.2d 877, 881 (2d Dist. 1982);
Johnson v. St. Bernard Hosp., 79 Ill. App. 3d 709, 716, 399 N.E.2d 198, 204 (1st Dist.
1979).
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This should be true regardless of whether they are employed by
one of the parties to the suit.
Participants in the medical care surrounding the occurrence
have good reason to fear potential liability for the event, even if
they have not been named as defendants in the complaint. Under
section 2-616 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the complaint can
easily be amended at any time before final judgment for the purpose of conforming the pleadings to the proof or to "introduc[e]
any party who ought to have been joined as a plaintiff or a defendant."7 2 Moreover, under the Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors Act, other defendants may name any of the participants in the occurrence as a third-party defendant by filing a thirdparty claim prior to trial in the original action.73 Thus, any of the
participants in the occurrence are potential defendants and become
adverse to the plaintiff as soon as the lawsuit is initiated. As such,
they are entitled to legal representation and should be able to join
with the hospital or any of the other defendants in defending the
action."4
In addition, the unnamed participant in the occurrence is likely
to have been providing care to the plaintiff jointly with the defendants already named and, therefore, is likely to have been communicating with the defendants concerning the plaintiff's condition
while providing medical care. Particularly in the hospital setting,
medical care generally is provided by a team of physicians, nurses,
and other personnel, all of whom must discuss the patient's condition with each other to provide effective treatment. Consequently,
the patient has no reason to expect that the physician or other hos72.
73.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-616 (1987).

ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 70, para. 305 (1987). See Laue v. Leifheit, 105 I11.
2d 191,

473 N.E.2d 939 (1984); Tisoncik v. Szczepankiewicz, 113 Ill.
App. 3d 240, 245-46, 446
N.E.2d 1271, 1275 (1st Dist. 1983).

74. See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987), modified
842 F.2d 1135 (1988) (communications among client, attorney, and third party on matter
of common interest privileged even though third party not sued and faces no immediate
liability); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1335-37 (7th Cir. 1979) (statements
to codefendant's attorney are privileged when related to any purpose common to participating codefendants); Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1965) (conferences between actual or prospective codefendants and their attorneys concerning
common issues to facilitate representation in subsequent proceedings are subject to attorney-client privilege); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Nov. 16, 1974, 406 F. Supp. 381, 389
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (attorney-client privilege covers communications to prospective or actual codefendants' attorney in interests of joint defense effort); Stanley Works v. Haeger
Potteries, Inc., 35 F.R.D. 551, 554-55 (N.D. 11. 1964) (work product privilege applicable
when attorneys for parties with mutual interest in litigation exchange work product);
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hatas, 287 Ala. 344, 366-67, 252 So. 2d 7, 27-28
(1971); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 91, at 219 (Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
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pital personnel will maintain his confidences from the other participants in his care.75 Indeed, the patient likely would hope that his
physicians would all be advised of any information relevant to his
condition so that their decisions are fully informed. There is no
reason for the patient to assume that his decision to name one of
the participants in his medical care as a defendant should, by itself,
dictate that the medical care providers would stop sharing information about the treatment they jointly provided, when all may
fear eventually being named in the suit as a defendant or third
party defendant.76
V.

CONCLUSION

The Petrillo court created a new type of witness privilege, which
protects the means by which communications are discovered,
rather than protecting the communication itself from discovery. In
interpreting this privilege, courts should avoid mechanical approaches to new situations, such as the court applied in Ritter. If
the courts applying the Petrillo privilege fail to weigh both the justifications for the privilege and the countervailing problems which
the privilege creates, including the inability of potential defendants
to prepare their defense effectively with the advice of counsel, the
Petrillo rule will become another weapon in the plaintiff's arsenal,
rather than a method to protect the legitimate expectations of patients that their physicians will continue to fulfill their roles as fidu75. There is little reason to believe that most patients expect their physicians to maintain any confidentiality about their condition and treatment, except in unusual cases such
as sexually transmitted diseases and psychotherapy. As Wigmore noted:
Barring the facts of venereal disease and criminal abortion, there is hardly a fact
in the categories of medicine in which the patient himself attempts to preserve
any real secrecy. Most of one's ailments are immediately disclosed and discussed. The few that are not openly visible are at least explained to intimates.
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380(a), at 829 (McNaughten rev. ed. 1961). Thus, it is not
at all unusual to hear physicians discussing a patient's condition and treatment on televised news broadcasts when the patients are public figures, have been injured in a newsworthy manner, or have undergone an experimental procedure. It is rare, however, to
hear objections to this practice.
76. It is likely to be difficult at the beginning of a lawsuit to determine which physicians took part in the occurrence and, therefore, should be subject to this proposed exemption to Petrillo. As discussed above, it is often impossible to determine in advance
what will constitute the focus of the plaintiff's criticisms of the medical care he received.
In many cases, however, there will be one or more distinct episodes when the patient's
condition has taken a dramatic, unexpected turn for the worse, which likely will constitute at least one focus of the plaintiff's complaint. The physicians involved in these incidents, even if not criticized, are likely to fear potential liability and to want to coordinate
their defense with other physicians involved in the event. Thus, they should be exempt
from the bar on ex parte communications with defense counsel.
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ciaries after suit has been brought. The court in Ritter failed to
consider any of the problems its holding would create or whether
the patients had any legitimate continued expectation of confidentiality. Therefore, it extended the Petrillorule far beyond its natural
boundaries, and should not be followed in future cases.

